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THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE FAMILY 
Lee E. Teitelbaum* 
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA. By Michael Grossberg. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press. 1985. Pp. xiv, 417. $32. 
Governing the Hearth is one of those rare things: an indispensable 
book within its field. It falls properly within that category for two 
reasons. One is that it is the first of its kind, a general (although not 
an exhaustive) history of a formative period in American family law. 
The second is that, quite apart from novelty, it is very well done. Gov-
erning the Hearth is full of insight, interestingly told, and a reference 
of first resort for the several areas it covers in detail. Professor Gross-
berg has not uttered the final or even the penultimate word on the 
subject, but he does have the first word and, for a long time to come, 
discussions of the legal history of the family will measure themselves 
and be measured against his analysis. 
The subject matter, content, and interpretation of Governing the 
Hearth all merit consideration in this review. It should be said at the 
outset that this is a monograph rather than an encyclopedia; there is 
no pretense to a general history of legal regulation of the family. The 
book considers only six topics within domestic relations in detail: 
breach of promise actions, marital licensure requirements, limits on 
qualifications to marry, limits on procreation, rights of illegitimate 
children, and doctrines regarding the custody of children. These top-
ics are developed not simply because their histories are interesting 
(although they are), but rather to illustrate Professor Grossberg's prin-
cipal themes regarding the American legal history of the family. 
Before considering those themes and the supporting evidence 
drawn from the areas of family law mentioned above, it is pertinent 
that Professor Grossberg is trained as an historian. This is not meant 
to suggest that his understanding of legal issues is infirm, because it is 
not. On the contrary, his analyses are accurate and helpful even for 
those who are primarily interested in legal doctrinal development. 
What is important is that Professor Grossberg seeks to explain the 
legal history of the family according to the view of the history of the 
family generally accepted by social historians. That view, which is 
• Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1966, Harvard 
University; LL.M. 1968, Northwestern University. - Ed. The author is much indebted to Pro· 
fessor Carl Schneider for his most helpful comments on this essay. 
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explicitly adopted at a number of points in the book, warrants brief 
summary. 
The colonial family, it is generally agreed, was an extension and 
reflection of the community at large. This notion is conventionally 
expressed by the preacher's description of the family as "a little 
church, and a little commonwealth," an expression which is meant to 
capture two crucial elements of the place of colonial families. One is 
their interdependence with the greater society, to which they were 
joined "in a relation of profound reciprocity" such that "one might 
almost say they [were] continuous with one another."1 The second 
element is the sharing by family and society of a common theory of 
organization. The political theory which informed governance in the 
commonwealth likewise defined the structure and governance of the 
family. It does not matter for present purposes whether the principles 
of family organization followed from the principles generally gov-
erning social organization or the reverse; it does matter that both fam-
ily and general polities assumed a single understanding of good order. 
That theory, as Professor Grossberg demonstrates, was one of hierar-
chical order and, particularly, patriarchy, according to which author-
ity is generally vested in the "governor" - a term applied in 
eighteenth-century usage to both domestic and public sovereigns. 
Within the patriarchal family, authority rested with the white, 
male heads of household who determined the places and activities of 
others. Wives were expected to defer to the wills of their husbands, a 
deference supported by the doctrine of marital unity which denied 
them legal independence and by property laws which accorded hus-
bands the rights generally to use and dispose of their wives' property. 
Children remained within the home as long as their fathers wished 
them to do so; they could be apprenticed to others and were generally 
bound to deliver their earnings to their fathers. Professor Grossberg 
offers a striking description of the state of mind associated with this 
kind of authority, taken from a 1712 issue of The Spectator: 
Nothing is more gratifying to the mind of man than power or domin-
ion; and this I think myself amply possessed of, as I am the father of a 
family. I am perpetually taken up in giving out orders, in prescribing 
duties, in hearing parties, in administering justice, and in distributing 
rewards and punishments.2 
At least in the colonies, patriarchalism was sometimes of an ideal 
1. Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE 
AMERICAN FAMILY 43, 46 (y. Tufte & B. Myerhoff eds. 1979) [hereinafter Demos, Images]. For 
similar views see J. DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COL-
ONY (1970) [hereinafter J. DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH]; E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN 
FAMILY (1944); C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980). 
2. P. 5 (citing J. SPRUILL, WOMEN'S LIFE AND WORK IN THE SOUTHERN COLONIES 44 
(1938)). 
1054 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1052 
type, if not a stereotype. Professor Grossberg recognizes, as others 
have, that the pure form of the patriarchal family did not survive 
transplantation to the new world (if indeed it existed in the old). Colo-
nial life permitted women economic and social freedoms not available 
in Europe, and the ready availability of land weakened the dependence 
of older children on their fathers. Moreover, the ideology of the Puri-
tan family was complex and perhaps inconsistent. While the preacher 
John Robinson described the wife's role as one of "reverent subjec-
tion" to the will of her husband, 3 the relation of husband and wife has 
been described as a union of partners, entailing mutual respect and 
shared responsibility.4 Nonetheless, the current theory of the colonial 
family generally holds that the patriarchal and integrated family en-
dured in theory and substantially in practice. 
Toward the end of the eighteenth century came, however, a radical 
change in the internal relationships and external functions of the fam-
ily. The household became a refuge from, rather than an extension of, 
the general community. Not only the locus but the perception of so-
cial and econowp life changed as industrialization moved the work-
place from home to factory or office. The general community was 
regarded as an egoistic, unrelentingly competitive jungle from which 
respite was necessary. Social historians agree that it was the home 
that served that function. Philippe Aries saw in the industrial family 
"the private domain, the only place where a person could legitimately 
escape the inquisitive stare of industrial society."5 John Demos de-
scribes it as "a bastion of peace, of repose, of orderliness, of umvaver-
ing devotion to people and principles beyond the self."6 
The resulting separation between work and home was expressed in 
spousal roles. Husbands were expected to provide for their families by 
success in the workplace and to be supportive, although not very ac-
tive, at home. The wife's domain was the household; her responsibili-
ties suited her special capacities for child-rearing and managing the 
domestic economy. 
This change in the relation of the family to the general society was 
associated, Professor Grossberg argues, with the emergence of a dis-
tinctive view of the "republican family," which in tum was informed 
by an emerging republican ideology. The chief elements of this repub-
licanism included dislike for unaccountable authority and governmen-
tal activism, the equation of property rights with independence, a 
commitment to self-government and laissez-faire principles, and a 
3. THE WORKS OF JOHN ROBINSON 239-40 (R. Ashton ed. 1851), quoted in J. DEMOS, A 
LITILE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 1, at 83. 
4. E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY 29-64 (rev. ed. 1966). 
5. Aries, The Family and the City in the Old World and the New, in CHANGING IMAGES OF 
THE FAMILY, supra note 1, at 29, 33. 
6. Demos, Images, supra note 1, at 51. 
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view of human relations that emphasized voluntary consent (pp. 6-7). 
Although this theory recognized bonds, they flowed from reciprocal 
obligations rather than from birth or status. The social aspects of this 
shift are found in an increase in companionate marriage, a recognition 
of the wife's equality and soon her superiority within the domestic 
realm, and a closer, more democratic relation between parents and 
children. 
The principal thrust of Governing the Hearth is to demonstrate the 
legal aspects of this shift to the republican family. In particular, Pro-
fessor Grossberg defends the proposition that "[f]or the family, and 
especially for its law, republicanism was both a founding creed and a 
continuing frame of reference" (p. 7). The burden of Professor Gross-
berg's treatment oflegal developments in specific areas is to instantiate 
this claim, and to this - and to the implications of his analysis - we 
should now tum. 
Professor Grossberg identifies the republican concept of domestic 
relations with several propositions. The most central of these is reli-
ance on contract as a metaphor for social and economic relations (p. 
19). Relations were not determined by the ascribed status of actors 
but by their intentions. Concomitantly, the household came to be re-
garded not as an organic unit but as a collection of distinct individuals, 
each with his or her own claims of right. This conceptualization of 
relations within the family took root in the immediate post-Revolu-
tionary period and flourished during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. The second half of that century saw increasing public con-
cern about state regulation of those relations, but not, in Professor 
Grossberg's view, an abandonment of republican principles. 
This schema is most clearly developed in connection with limita-
tions on marriage. Take, for example, laws regarding recognition of 
nonceremonial marriages. During the colonial period, informal mar-
riage was possible but restricted by various forms of parental and com-
munity oversight. After the Revolution, as Grossberg sees it, courts 
emphasized the private nature of contracts, and typically described 
marriage in simple contractual terms. Kent's Commentaries insisted, 
"No peculiar ceremonies are requisite by the common law to the valid 
celebration of the marriage. The consent of the parties is all that is 
required .... "7 Although there was some dissent from this debatable 
interpretation of the requirement for common-law marriage, Chancel-
lor Kent's view generally prevailed, and was supported as well by leg-
islative action to ease rules on entrance to marriage. Even to the 
extent that those statutes left parents some formal power of consent to 
marriages by young persons, judges often refused to void the underage 
marriages although they might hold public officials accountable for 
their celebration (pp. 77-78). 
7. Pp. 70-71(quoting2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 75 (1826)). 
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Easing the rules for proof of marriage supported, Professor Gross-
berg argues, the contract view of domestic relations. Persons could 
express their assent in a variety of ways, and courts and legislatures 
sought to give effect to their intentions, at least whenever the parties 
lived together. "The official recognition of irregular marriages," he 
observes, "acted as a further step from the patriarchal families of the 
nation's colonial past, one more step toward the republican concept of 
the household as a voluntary collection of separate individuals" (p. 
83). 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, the bal-
ance swung toward state regulation. Divorce rates rose steadily dur-
ing the nineteenth century, creating deep public concern. Reformers 
saw in the ready recognition of marriages a principal cause of marital 
instability and supported restrictive marriage laws as a form of social 
therapeutics. Their appeals were primarily successful with legisla-
tures; late nineteenth-century statutes increasingly required marital 
licenses, imposed waiting periods before celebration, and disapproved 
common-law marriages. Courts were seemingly less ready to join in 
the reform movement. Few codes expressly made informal marriages 
void, and a number of judges held that regulations concerning licen-
sure and celebration were only directory. Professor Grossberg inter-
prets this pattern of judicial activity as reflecting a judicial desire to 
preserve the distinction between public and private realms of life and, 
particularly, a reluctance to make matrimony entirely a state question 
(p. 100). However, he also maintains that even the marriage reform 
movement did not seek to reestablish that patriarchy, but rather to 
superimpose considerations of "public interest" on the republican base 
of marriage law (p. 83). Revisions in marital regulations and judicial 
decisions in the end "maintained the status of marriage as an act be-
tween individuals, not families" (p. 97). 
Professor Grossberg traces the same themes in connection with 
laws concerning qualifications for marriage. In some areas, the evi-
dence seems clearly to support this schema. At early common law and 
during the early republic, for example, mental condition was of mini-
mal concern; it became relevant only when a prospective spouse suf-
fered mental deficiency to such a drastic degree that consent, and 
therefore contract, was impeached. Insanity was not a ground for an-
nulment or divorce during this period. By the second half of the cen-
tury, however, real concern was expressed about marriages by the 
insane or mentally disabled. Feminist and social scientist Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, a prominent voice in the eugenics movement, argued 
that the law of heredity should exclude the physically, intellectually, 
and morally deficient from entering into marriage (and therefore pro-
creation) (p. 148). George Howard, a sociologist and author of The 
History of Matrimonial Institutions, complained in 1904 that "under 
pleas of 'romantic love' we blandly yield to sexual attraction in chaos-
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ing our mates, ignoring the welfare of the race" (p. 148). This concern 
was ultimately reflected in laws prohibiting the insane, feebleminded, 
epileptic, and venereally diseased from marrying. 
Early acceptance of minimal limitations on marriage, followed by 
late nineteenth-century revision, also characterized other qualifica-
tions for matrimony. With respect to age, there was little need for 
republicans to shift in the direction of greater freedom to marry. The 
common-law ages of consent (fourteen for males, twelve for females) 
were so low that virtually no case of underage marriage can be found. 
Professor Grossberg does suggest that laws in the republican period 
were more permissive than had been true at common law, but he does 
not pursue that point in detail (pp. 105-06). It is, however, quite clear 
that a substantial effort to raise marital ages arose during the late nine-
teenth century. Groups with such earnest names as the Social Purity 
Alliance singled out youthful marriages as a prime source of marital 
instability, and legislatures responded. By 1906, only seventeen states 
and territories still used the common-law age minima (p. 142). 
The role of courts in this enterprise was, as it had been for com-
mon-law marriage, ambiguous, at least as Professor Grossberg sees it. 
While judges during the Progressive era expressed approval of in-
creased age requirements, they tended to treat youthful marriages as 
voidable rather than void and as valid (ratified) if the parties continued 
to live together after both reached the age of consent. This approach, 
Professor Grossberg suggests, reflected a continuing judicial prefer-
ence for common-law (judicial) authority which courts invoked when-
ever a statute could be read to allow them discretion. 
Governing the Hearth pursues the same schema in its discussion of 
the law regarding limitations on procreation, particularly contracep-
tion and abortion. This story is extraordinarily interesting and well 
told. During the early republican period, states generally followed the 
common-law view of abortion which was one of considerable (and ini-
tially surprising) toleration. The termination of a fetus before quick-
ening (approximately four to five months) was not criminal and 
termination even of a quickened fetus was nonfelonious: it was man-
slaughter rather than murder. More important, only the abortionist 
and not the mother was punishable. Although England strengthened 
its laws against abortion in 1803, American jurisdictions did not fol-
low suit and, indeed, some states further relaxed the common law by 
specifically authorizing therapeutic abortions when necessary to pre-
serve the life of the mother. Professor Grossberg understands this part 
of the history of abortion law as deference to middle-class desires to 
limit families and to republican principles of voluntarism, even in 
childbirth. And it does seem that many middle-class (and other) 
women had the desire to limit the size of their families; birth rates 
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dropped significantly from an average of 7.04 live births per woman in 
1800 to 5.21 in 1860 and then to 3.56 in 1900 (pp. 156, 170). 
This practical toleration of abortion lasted until about the middle 
of the nineteenth century, when a number of states enacted more re-
strictive laws. Physicians seem to have taken the lead in this revision; 
they criticized the "quickening" rule as an absurd distinction based on 
religious rather than scientific grounds and insisted on their authority 
to determine when termination of a fetus was appropriate. By the 
1880s, the doctors had their way with women and the quickening doc-
trine began to disappear from criminal codes, although it often re-
tained some relevance for punishment. As Professor Grossberg 
observes, enlargement of the definition of life for these purposes neces-
sarily compromised the emancipation of women by making "the 
womb part of the public domain" (p. 186). 
The story of contraceptive regulation is a curious one as well. Un-
like abortion, there were no laws in this regard at common law or 
during most of the nineteenth century. Beginning in the 1870s, how-
ever, purity campaigners, led by the egregious Anthony Comstock, 
persuaded federal and state legislatures to label both abortion and con-
traception obscene and to prohibit at least their public discussion. The 
swift response to those appeals capped the determination of late nine-
teenth-century family savers to ban all forms of family limitation. The 
demands of Comstockery, which were supported by such odd bedfel-
lows as Margaret Sanger and the president of the American Medical 
Association (pp. 190-91), plainly conflicted with voluntaristic princi-
ples and particularly with the view that women should be able to de-
cide when and whether to have children. But, as commonly occurred 
during the last half of the century, social defense considerations over-
whelmed appeals to autonomy. 
Here as elsewhere, Professor Grossberg's discussion sharply con-
trasts the roles of legislatures and courts. "As they did in marriage 
law," he observes, "legislators responded more decisively to the pres-
sures of reformers than did judges, who retained their self-proclaimed 
commitments to maintaining doctrinal and institutional continuity as 
well as protecting the family" (p. 195). And here, perhaps most 
plainly, Governing the Hearth reveals a seeming bias against courts. 
To describe the legislative reaction to the purity campaign as "deci-
sive" rather than, for example, "panicky" gives the state legislatures 
perhaps undue credit, and to suggest that courts were "indecisive" in 
punishing purveyors of birth control information more readily than 
they did family members seems a bit harsh. 
The last two substantive chapters extend Professor Grossberg's in-
terpretation to parent-child relations. The first does so in connection 
with the legal treatment of bastardy. It is familiar knowledge that the 
common law regarded an illegitimate child as filius nullius, barely a 
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person, who could claim no legal relations with his or her parents or 
with their relatives. The only parental obligation was one of support 
imposed by the poor law. The republican version of bastardy law un-
dermined that view in a number of ways. The chances of becoming a 
bastard were reduced by judicial recognition of common-law mar-
riages and by statutes that declared the offspring of an annulled mar-
riage, or of parents who subsequently married, to be legitimate. A 
more limited form of acceptance also emerged in statutes that permit-
ted illegitimate children who were acknowledged by formal act to 
inherit. 
It is here that Professor Grossberg most clearly and persuasively 
traces the links between legal development and republican theory. 
Bastardization was regarded as unfairly visiting upon innocents the 
guilt of their parents. The voluntaristic and individualistic principles 
of post-Revolutionary America seemed to insist that fault was the re-
sult of individual choice and could not be ascribed from the acts of 
others. 
A voluntaristic element also appears in a second aspect of the his-
tory of bastardy in this country. Not only did republican legislatures 
and courts reduce the chances of being born a bastard by changing the 
definition of legitimacy, they created certain family rights even for 
children whom they did not legitimate. In the first place, courts sup-
ported maternal rights to custody of children born out of wedlock as 
against the putative father and, in doing so, created a set of reciprocal 
duties between at least one parent and an illegitimate child. Modifica-
tion of poor laws to allow the child to be a charge of the mother's 
residence rather than his or her place of birth tended in much the same 
direction, as courts found it "agreeable to the law of nature and rea-
son" to treat an illegitimate child as part of the mother's family (pp. 
210-11). Legislatures concomitantly revised inheritance laws to per-
mit bastards to take from their mothers, an alteration which was in 
some places quite expressly related to a more general republican desire 
to eliminate those descent laws (such as primogeniture) which favored 
one child over others and perpetuated intrafamilial dependency. The 
principles of descent were regarded in at least some states as founded 
on human affections rather than accident of birth, and the law set out 
to recognize that bond by endowing illegitimate children with inherita-
ble blood at least from their mothers (p. 214). 
The changes found in other areas of family law during the latter 
half of the nineteenth century do not, however, appear in the law of 
bastardy. That states did not retrench in respect of bastardy supports 
Professor Grossberg's general interpretation that late nineteenth-cen-
tury zeal to reform family law did not seek a return to patriarchy. 
Indeed, some of those reformers advocated further expanding the 
rights of illegitimates by establishing a link between the child and his 
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father, a campaign which was generally unsuccessful and divided even 
the reformers. The issue was presented as a conflict between individ-
ual rights and support for the family as an institution, and in the Pro-
gressive period the former routinely gave way to the latter. 
The last substantive chapter is a detailed and invaluable essay on 
custody rights. In this area, Professor Grossberg says, "[L]aw ... 
took to its logical conclusion the republican vision of the family as a 
collection of individuals each with his or her own needs and rights" (p. 
234). The hierarchical concept of the family, which gave fathers near-
plenary authority over children, 8 fell before three developments: ac-
ceptance of principles of child nurture (the "best interests of the 
child") to circumscribe paternal custody rights and support maternal 
claims; reliance on those same principles to permit surrogate parents 
to replace natural parents as custodians; and creation (through adop-
tion) of an "artificial" family based on voluntarism rather than blood. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, public and legal opinion agreed 
that parental claims were contingent and that parentship was not a 
matter of status or property right but a kind of limited trusteeship for 
the benefit of the child. Parental fitness, rather than paternal right, 
became the focus of custody disputes, an approach which in tum sup-
posed that the interests of children are independent of those of the 
parents. Emphasis on the rights of young persons, which Professor 
Grossberg describes as an "adversarial" view of the family, together 
with the broad discretion that approach encouraged, "constituted yet 
another way in which traditional family law was upset by republican 
beliefs and practices" (pp. 283-84). 
The final chapter of Governing the Hearth focuses on a theme 
sounded throughout the book, but perhaps most fully and persuasively 
developed in the chapter on custody rights: the emergence of a "judi-
cial patriarchy." It is significant that when courts created the custody 
principles described above, they did not simply replace paternal au-
thority with maternal power. True, a presumption that mothers were 
the best custodians of children emerged in courts and was supported 
by a large body of social opinion regarding the altruism and purity of 
women. However, that presumption was never conclusive. The ulti-
mate custodial principle was the child's best interests, a doctrine 
which placed with courts (and not parents) the responsibility for de-
ciding with whom a child should be placed and, correlatively, for de-
fining what forms of parental conduct were appropriate. 
In fact, Professor Grossberg argues, patriarchy did not disappear 
during the nineteenth century, but was replaced by a judicial authority 
with many of the same characteristics. Although the claims of women 
8. Common law doctrine assigned to fathers sole custodial authority over their legitimate 
children. Mothers were entitled to respect from, but not control over, their offspring. See 2 J. 
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 193-94 (2d ed. 1832). 
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(and children) were more readily recognized in the nineteenth century 
than previously, their position was never more than one of partial ca-
pacity. In deciding when women were entitled to custody and what 
kinds of support they could claim, courts continued to employ as-
sumptions associated with the separate spheres of men and women. 
Judges thus "allowed for an expanded feminine presence in the legal 
order, but in a way that ensured that women's domestic powers would 
not be translated into extensive external political and economic au-
thority" (p. 301). 
Finally, Professor Grossberg closes with some general observations 
on the impact of judicial patriarchy. One such impact was the crea-
tion of a language for thinking about the family: a topic Grossberg 
regrettably does not pursue in any detail (p. 302). Another was the 
adoption of an adversarial method for approaching disputes regarding 
families. The tendency was to define the family as a collection of dis-
tinct legal personalities with potentially antagonistic relations: hus-
band versus wife, parent versus child, state versus father. This focus 
on the contending parties in turn prevented a clear articulation of the 
public's role in family governance; legitimate community interests 
were lost in the focus on the contention of individual rights and their 
mediation by common-law authority (p. 303). The implications of this 
strategy can be found in the development of the juvenile court and in 
much of the course of family law during this century. 
This summary, even though it is relatively long, only touches the 
surface of some parts of some of the stories told in Governing the 
Hearth. It should make clear, however, that we owe Professor Gross-
berg a number of debts. One is for providing massive and careful re-
search in several areas within family law. Another is for imposing a 
form of intellectual order on that mass of material that will allow eval-
uation of the currents of legislative and judicial development within 
the field. A third debt is due his effort to relate legal developments to 
ideologies within traditional legal sources (legislatures and courts) and 
outside those sources, permitting us a sense of the multiplicity of com-
munities and forces which contributed to family law. 
There is a fourth debt to be acknowledged as well - to Professor 
Grossberg's clarity and candor in setting out his own assumptions, 
which invites independent inquiry into the analyses he himself em-
ploys. The remainder of this review addresses questions raised by Gov-
erning the Hearth, not so much to quarrel with Professor Grossberg's 
interpretations as to see how rich a seam he has opened for all of us. 
One general question is whether it is true, as seems to be implicit in 
his general analysis, that the legal history of the family can adequately 
be understood in the terms customarily employed by social historians. 
I have argued at length in another place that the fit between them is 
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far from perfect.9 The social history of the family supposes a move-
ment from a household closely integrated with the general community 
to one sharply removed from that community, serving as a refuge 
from political and economic life. Perhaps that description can be sup-
ported to a degree for the first half of the nineteenth century, but it is 
hard to reconcile with legal developments - even those presented by 
Professor Grossberg - during the latter part of the century. The ob-
vious analogue in law to social discourse regarding the separation of 
public and private spheres would be a diminution in direct regulation 
of the private realm: that is, of the conduct of family members. That 
does not seem to be the case, however, at least after the Civil War. 
On the contrary, both public opinion and official action increas-
ingly sought to regulate directly various aspects of the formation and 
conduct of domestic relations. Informal marriages were increasingly 
disapproved and bureaucratic supervision installed; mental and physi-
cal requirements for marriage came to be specified. Minimal age re-
quirements for marriage increased significantly. During the same 
period, activities within the family were regulated by laws making 
abortion at any stage criminal and by prohibiting the distribution of 
information concerning contraception. The revision of custody laws 
and the recognition of adoption also did little to preserve a separate 
sphere or refuge. Removing sole custodial authority from fathers may 
well have destroyed a traditional element of patriarchy, but it also con-
verted a private (if patriarchal) system for decisionmaking into a ques-
tion of sound public policy. It became the business of courts to 
determine the best interests of children, which in turn meant that pub-
lic agencies would decide what conduct and circumstances were desir-
able in child-rearing and what were not. 
For its part, adoption may have permitted parties to create new 
families on a voluntaristic basis, but at the same moment it made the 
creation of those families a public enterprise. This was true both as a 
matter of purpose and as a matter of result. Adoption was intended by 
many supporters to be an alternative to inadequate institutional forms 
of child placement and a bulwark against the threat to good order 
associated with the plight of homeless, neglected, and delinquent chil-
dren. Indeed, as Professor Grossberg points out (p. 273) adoption was 
often viewed in the late nineteenth century as a panacea for the ills 
besetting American households, which could be remedied by the sub-
stitution of new (adequate) families for old (inadequate) ones. There is 
no little irony, and some real significance, in the fact that the Puritans 
employed much the same strategy of social control when they placed 
inadequately cared-for children with good homes in the community. 
And that irony makes it difficult to see the emergence of adoption as 
reflecting a "privatization" of the nineteenth-century family. 
9. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135. 
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In result, the recognition of adoption also had distinctly public as-
pects. Judges had to satisfy themselves that any particular placement 
would promote the public interest and, particularly, that it would 
serve the child's welfare (pp. 273-74). This undertaking required offi-
cial review of the conduct and qualifications of prospective parents 
and, as time went on, the assistance of the newly risen social work 
profession, which itself was concerned with realizing the public inter-
est in the welfare of the young and disabled. 
One might add to these instances of public involvement in the con-
stitution and supervision of families the advent of compulsory educa-
tion and the juvenile court, 10 which are not much treated in Governing 
the Hearth. These developments involved even more direct assertions 
of public concern with and authority over the ways in which children 
were reared, and are hard to reconcile with a view of the family as 
something separate and removed from the general community. 
I do not go so far as to say that, in fact, governmental power was 
greater during the period when social historians see the family as a 
refuge. That claim would require a specific and limited definition of 
governmental power, understood as authority by prescriptive and pro-
scriptive rules, which I do not wish to defend. However, it is also hard 
to argue that privatization has any real meaning in connection with 
the legal history of the family during the nineteenth century. And, 
indeed, it is even hard to argue that the concept has any generally 
defensible meaning.11 
An even larger set of questions concerns the strength, consistency, 
and durability of the republican vision of the family. Professor Gross-
berg argues, as we have seen, that republicanism was the organizing 
principle of family law throughout the nineteenth century. That ideol-
ogy, he seeks to show, directly informed legal rules and doctrines dur-
ing the early part of the period and was not overcome even when, 
during the latter part of the century, direct governmental regulation of 
families became more evident. 
However, assessing the clarity and consistency of republican ideol-
ogy, or at least of its implications for the legal regulation of domestic 
relations, presents some real difficulty. Professor Grossberg describes 
that ideology largely by reference to a set of associations: status is 
opposed to contract; patriarchy to voluntarism. The inference seems 
to be that status, patriarchy, and authority are generally opposed to 
contract, autonomy, and privacy. Thus, we are told, the patriarchal-
ism of colonial domestic relations was replaced by the republican prin-
ciple of contractualism, "whose lode star was the untrammeled 
autonomy of the individual will" (p. 19). 
10. See id. at 1147-57 for a discussion of these developments in connection with the "priva-
tization" issue. 
11. See id. at 1165-80. 
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The contract metaphor and the principle of voluntarism were 
surely important during the republican period, both generally and in 
law. This was true of talk regarding political relationships, education, 
and spousal relations. What is not quite so clear is that the rejection of 
patriarchalism also implied a general rejection of authority, as the 
"lode star" language seems to suggest. 
Take, as an example, the association between contractualism and 
autonomy in the area where it most obviously arises: entrance into 
marriage. It is true that legal rules during the republican period 
tended to sustain nonceremonial marriages, marriages by minor chil-
dren, and marriages where one spouse had made misleading state-
ments to the other. These are taken as evidence of increased spousal 
autonomy and respect for voluntarism. That is surely one way to look 
at things and, moreover, that view can be supported by contemporary 
social and legal discourse. It does not follow, however, that these rules 
and doctrines reflected a general abandonment of authority or that 
their sole significance lay in an increased ambit of personal freedom 
for spouses. 
At least the first two developments surely made it more likely that 
couples would be held to be married than had earlier been the case. It 
is less obvious that their autonomy - their range of life chances -
was enhanced thereby. One could claim that the principal effect of 
this body oflaw was to bind the youth who impetuously stumbled into 
matrimony, and the cohabitant who never gave marriage much serious 
thought, to a relationship rightly regarded during the early years of 
the nineteenth century as virtually indissoluble. Moreover, republican 
political and educative principles can be understood as approving that 
result. Generally speaking, the essence of republicanism was not un-
qualified autonomy but the freedom to choose one's bond. The point 
of the Revolution was not simply to dissolve an intolerable union but 
to create a more perfect one, founded upon voluntarism. 12 The same 
theory held at the level of domestic governance. Both Locke and 
Rousseau, whose works were widely invoked by republican Ameri-
cans, were much concerned with displacing patriarchal relations 
within the family. Neither, however, identified independence for chil-
dren with the dissolution of the family or its bonds. "The point [of 
recognizing freedom]," Jay Fliegelman observes, "was not so much to 
create autonomous individuals, as individuals who could and would 
participate in society." The assumption was that, given independence, 
the family would not dissolve but "reorganize on a voluntaristic, 
equalitarian, affectional, and, consequently, more permanent basis."13 
Indeed, the problem of reconciling liberty and authority was a cen-
12. J. FLElGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST 
PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY, 1750-1800, at 126-27 (1982). 
13. Id. at 33. 
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tral and pervasive issue in politics, both national and familial. 14 Rous-
seau's uncomfortable notion of the volonte generale - the general will 
into which individual wills must somehow be subsumed - exemplifies 
the difficulties of this accommodation for governance in the general 
society. At the domestic level, accommodation was sought by chang-
ing the understanding of how authority should be exercised. Locke 
urged education founded not on appeals to authority or precept but on 
the force of example. His concern, however, was not with eliminating 
or even circumscribing parental authority, but with rendering it more 
effective by removing the element of direct coercion. Rational self-
sufficiency and habits of right conduct must still be inculcated through 
guidance, without which young minds might be misinformed and 
misled. 15 
Although Rousseau, unlike Locke, assumed the innate goodness of 
man's nature, he also recognized clearly the role of authority in child-
rearing. Whereas freedom is the central theme of his Social Contract, 
Emile celebrates the wise use of power in education. Like Locke, 
Rousseau rejected precept and overt authority; learning is best accom-
plished through pursuit of one's natural inclinations. However, those 
inclinations are to be guided covertly, by conditioning rather than co-
ercion. This transformation in no way denies the legitimacy of author-
ity; few literary figures appear more powerful than Emile's tutor who 
speaks for Rousseau in saying proudly: "You can't guess how docile 
Emile, at age 20 is . . . . I leave him, admittedly, the consciousness of 
independence, but never has he been more completely subjected to me, 
for he is subject because he wishes to be."16 
The dilemma of liberty and authority was central not only to theo-
ries of pedagogy, which were understood as relevant to both national 
and domestic governance, but to the millennial aspirations of the new 
republic. Many colonials (and a number of Europeans) believed that 
the new world and especially the republic embodied the best hope for 
realizing social progress toward perfection. Voltaire's Philosophical 
Letters portrays America as the "improvement of all that was excel-
lent in England," and Condorcet looked to America as the basis for 
predicting what the final phase of human improvement would look 
like.17 Americans themselves shared this conviction even before the 
Revolution and, by the second half of the nineteenth century, as Rob-
ert Nisbet has observed, "the concept of progress had become almost 
as sacred to Americans of all classes as any formal religious precept. 
What tended to be stately philosophical wisdom ... in ... France or 
14. Id. at 14. 
15. Id. at 12-15. 
16. J. ROUSSEAU, EMILE (1762), quoted in R. NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 
240 (1980). See generally the discussion of progress as power in id. at 237-96. 
17. R. NISBET, supra note 16, at 194. 
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England was grass-roots evangelism in Am.erica."18 
For some, as for Adam Smith, progress in the republic was 
equated with the steady advance of individual freedom in the world. 
For others, however, it was not so much autonomy as equality that 
mattered, and power was necessary to the assurance of equal opportu-
nity and to the unfolding of the national potential. Benjamin Rush, 
for example, clearly recognized the tension between revolutionary 
ideals and the necessities of government as he urged the creation of 
public schools to correct the indulgence or ignorance of parents. He 
believed that these schools should develop self-discipline in children 
through the early inculcation of strict obedience to authority. Plainly, 
such a program involved not only authority but the authority of gov-
ernment, which Dr. Rush justified in Rousseauian terms. While re-
publicanism must recognize the sovereignty of individual wills, he 
argued, those wills must also accept the authority of the general will. 
And it was only through education that the republic could hope to fit 
the wills to each other and thereby produce "regularity and unison in 
government."19 Public education thus assumed some diminution in 
the autonomy of parents but it also served the interests of children, by 
removing inequalities flowing from differential parental capacities, and 
served the interests of the community, by improving the capacities of 
succeeding generations. 
Plainly, then, the rejection of patriarchalism did not mean the gen-
eral rejection of authority. It certainly entailed the rejection of certain 
forms of authority and certain results of patriarchal authority, most 
notably the latter's acceptance of and indeed emphasis on inequalities 
through birth. However, authority both within the family and within 
the general society continued to be accepted. Moreover, the authority 
of the household remained important to the governance of the com-
munity. While the household may not have been the mirror of public 
government, families were still considered the primary units of govern-
ance. And, as long as the household's centrality to society was ac-
knowledged - which it was throughout the nineteenth century as 
before - the separation between general and domestic welfare could 
never be sharply maintained. Voluntarism was indeed important to 
entrance into relationships and, it seemed, the best hope for survival of 
those relationships. It was not the only principle of republican life, 
however. 
These observations suggest that even the early republican period 
was not wholly committed to the celebration of autonomy. They may 
18. Id. at 204. 
19. B. RUSH, A PLAN FOR THE EsrABLJSHMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE DIFFUSION 
OF KNOWLEDGE IN PENNSYLVANIA: To WHICH ARE ADDED THOUGHTS UPON THE MODE OF 
EDUCATION, PROPER IN A REPUBLIC 17-18 (1786), quoted in Reinier, Rearing the Republica11 
Child: Attitudes and Practices in Post-Revolutionary Philadelphia, 39 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser. 
1982) 150, 158. 
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also help us understand the apparent reversals of policy which charac-
terized domestic relations law during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Take, once again, entrance into marriage. By mid-century, 
emphasis on the contractual nature of marriage had diminished or at 
least been given a different meaning. Courts and commentators rou-
tinely insisted that marriage was not merely a civil contract but a sta-
tus or social institution as well. Concomitantly, restrictions on access 
to that estate were widely imposed. As Professor Grossberg shows, 
informal marriages were increasingly disfavored; age limitations in-
creased dramatically in most jurisdictions, restrictions on marriage by 
persons with mental and physical disabilities widely appeared, and 
strict rules regarding interracial and plural marriages continued in 
force. In what seems a contradiction to the story he has just told, 
Professor Grossberg concludes that "the post-Revolutionary republi-
can base of nuptial law was never fully demolished" (p. 24). Marriage 
law remained wedded (his pun) to the assumptions that individual 
choice was the norm, that state intervention was justified only as a last 
resort in special situations, and that the judiciary was charged with 
mediating disputes along the public and private boundaries of the law 
(p. 24). 
If we associate republicanism simply with the contractual meta-
phor and voluntarism, this claim seems hard to defend. The precise 
thrust of late nineteenth-century law was to diminish the capacities of 
persons to marry whom they wanted when they wanted. If, however, 
republicanism is associated not with lack of public authority but with 
the lack of a particular kind of authority (patriarchalism and ascrip-
tion), then it seems right to say that the republican base remained in-
tact. Government undertook the tutor's role in Emile, although 
without much of the subtlety. Experience seemed to have shown that 
"romantic love" was too often pursued indiscreetly, and that guidance 
- sometimes firm guidance - was required for those who sought to 
enter this most important of relationships. The cure for perceived fail-
ures in domestic life was not a return to ascriptive principles of au-
thority but to what may have been understood as a more active 
tutorial role. 
That is not to say that antirepublicanistic impulses did not exist. It 
is hard to associate the eugenics movement or, in another area, Com-
stockery with any form of reliance on individual choice. A case can be 
made for the durability of republican principles, however, if the 
facilitative and social defense aspects of those principles are also 
recognized. 
The authoritarian aspect of republicanism presents itself even more 
clearly in connection with the development of child custody law, juve-
nile courts, and public education. We have already seen Dr. Rush's 
concern with educating children for republicanism, a theme taken up 
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in various ways by almost every child-caring agency during the nine-
teenth century. In great part, the assumption of public responsibility 
for education rested precisely on the assumption that society could 
best be improved through conditioning, the "invisible hand" of En-
lightenment political and educational theory. To the increasingly 
great extent that parents - and particularly immigrant parents not 
accustomed to American values - seemed unable to discharge that 
essential tutorial responsibility, some other agency had to step in. The 
state eagerly assumed that task. 20 The same principles informed the 
juvenile court movement, which claimed clinical and educative rather 
than punitive functions and sought merely to do for children what 
their parents, had they been capable or willing, should have done.21 
And, as Professor Grossberg convincingly shows, adoption and child 
custody practices confirmed governmental concern for the socializa-
tion of children by reserving to the state the power to decide which 
potential custodian was best capable of performing that crucial 
function. 
A number of other issues raised by Professor Grossberg's account 
would reward detailed consideration. The role of courts in the repub-
lican enterprise is surely one of these. Governing the Hearth both 
sheds much light on the operation of (mostly appellate) courts in do-
mestic relations matters and suggests some interesting questions about 
their function. A recurrent theme of his discussion is the tendency of 
courts, particularly during the latter part of the nineteenth century, to 
act as millstones around the neck of reform movements and legisla-
tures - often to the end of assuming themselves the patriarchal au-
thority which republicanism had wrested from heads of households. 
Whether it is right to regard the behavior of courts as "patriarchal," 
or merely as a reflection of the dark side of Enlightenment and repub-
lican ideology, is one question well worth exploring. 
Characterization of nineteenth-century judicial authority in patri-
archal terms seems most justified in connection with the creation of 
common-law doctrines placing with courts a discretion previously 
20. The continuity of Enlightenment principles in public education throughout the nine· 
teenth century can be sensed through Richard Hofstadter's summary of John Dewey's views: "If 
a democratic society is truly to serve all its members, it must devise schools in which, at the 
germinal point in childhood, these members will be able to cultivate their capacities and, instead 
of simply reproducing the qualities of the larger society, will learn how to improve them." R. 
HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 362-63 (1963). Dewey himself ob-
served that public schools would do "systematically and in a large, intelligent, and competent 
way what for various reasons can be done in most households only in a comparatively meager 
and haphazard manner." J. DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 47.53 (1900), quoted in 2 
CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 1117, 1119 (R. Bremner ed. 1971). 
21. Judge Cabot of the Boston Juvenile Court urged the public to "[r]emember the fathers 
and mothers have failed, or the child has no business [in the court], and it is when they failed that 
the state opened this way to receive them, into the court, and said, 'This is the way in which we 
want you to grow up.' " Cabot, The Detention of Children as a Part of Treatment. in THE 
CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 246, 249 (J. Addams ed. 1925). 
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vested in fathers (as with child custody). That description is, however, 
problematic even in this case. Patriarchy seems to imply, among other 
things, near-plenary discretion arising out of one's status. The "best 
interests" doctrine surely did create considerable judicial discretion; 
however, discretion in itself does not mean patriarchal authority. 
Often, judicial discretion is the product of legislative decision rather 
than an aspect of some distinctively judicial "right" or "power." This 
at least came to be true of custodial decisions, as legislatures rapidly 
adopted the "best interests" standard. Moreover, judges may well 
have regarded their custodial decisions not as reflecting an inherent 
authority in this regard, but rather as the exercise of a discretion 
which was justified by instrumental goals outside of their own claims 
to authority. It also seems significant that appellate courts routinely 
developed subsidiary doctrines - such as the tender-years presump-
tion and the maternal preference - which often closely approximated 
"bright-line rules" and served as sharp limits on the exercise of trial 
court discretion. 
It is even less clear that the narrow construction of ambiguous stat-
utes (as with inheritance) or the protection of procedural rights for 
abortionists reflect any sense of patriarchal power. No doubt these 
decisions served to restrict the reach of changes in the law sought by 
lay and legislative proponents of reform. However, the tension be-
tween what proponents of a law wish, what the legislature enacts, and 
what courts understand by that enactment is a legal process problem 
which arose before and continues after the nineteenth-century concern 
for republican principles. Much of what seems conservative or recalci-
trant in the behavior of judges may reflect not patriarchalism but a 
distinctively legal culture or ideology, which bears only the most com-
plex relationship to other ideologies and requires independent inquiry. 
Another matter that warrants far more extensive discussion than 
can be attempted here is the vision of the home which emerged in 
social and legal discourse during the nineteenth century. In legal un-
derstanding, as Professor Grossberg interprets it, the republican fam-
ily was not an organic unit but a collection of individuals, each with 
his or her own claims of rights. He offers a great deal of convincing 
evidence for this conceptualization. Further support, were any 
needed, could be found in the constant talk (particularly toward the 
end of the nineteenth century) about the rights of children to educa-
tion, socialization, and nurture employed by advocates of compulsory 
education, the juvenile court, and child labor laws. This reconceptual-
ization of the family in individualistic terms bears further exploration 
along several avenues. One such avenue concerns the nature of "rights 
talk" in this area. Particularly in connection with children, discourse 
about rights cannot simply be identified with claims of autonomy or 
choice for the rights-holders. Indeed, its thrust is in quite the other 
direction. Compulsory education, child labor laws, and the like were 
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justified in great part by the desire to prevent children from asserting 
independence, or being left independent, before they were ready. No-
body believed that children could or should choose whether to attend 
school or receive proper guidance; these were rights to opportunity 
rather than to substantive freedom. The function of rights talk here is 
to authorize official supervision when parents failed, not to deny the 
appropriateness of control by some agency.22 
It would be worth considering whether rights talk in connection 
with women also means something other than autonomy, and Profes-
sor Grossberg suggests that it does. He observes that the tendency at 
least of courts was to empower women not simply to act, but to act 
according to specific nineteenth-century ("Victorian") values. When 
one also considers the widespread use then and now of talk about the 
family as an "entity," a very complex conceptualization of the rela-
tionship between the idea of the family and the roles of its members 
begins to emerge. 
A second and related aspect of the nineteenth-century reconceptu-
alization of the family has to do with the adequacy of that reconceptu-
alization itself. An inquiry of this sort is of great current importance 
because that theory still greatly influences current thought about the 
family and its relation to law. It is worth asking whether a legal view 
of the family as a collection of individuals ultimately is satisfying or 
sensible. The tendency has been to express this approach in terms of 
classical liberal rights talk, which contrasts sharply with a simultane-
ous tendency to speak of the family as an entity which is somehow 
entitled to privacy or autonomy. An argument can be made that it is 
not coherent to regard the family both as an entity with its own claims 
and as a collection of individual actors with their own rights. In addi-
tion, something may seem unsatisfying about both of these views, 
which fail to capture either the integrity or the plurality of domestic 
relations.23 But this is an issue, like the others barely sketched above, 
which is mentioned here only in order to suggest the richness of the 
questions Professor Grossberg's work provokes. 
It is impossible to say which is more exciting: what Governing the 
Hearth sets out or what it leads its readers to think about. Early on I 
suggested that this will not be the last word on the subject. That may 
be the best praise to give any book. We will all be indebted to Profes-
sor Grossberg not only today, for what he has said, but tomorrow for 
what other historians and lawyers will say. 
22. See generally Teitelbaum, Foreword: The Meanings of Rights of Children, 10 N.M. L. 
REV. 235 (1980). 
23. For discussion touching on this issue, see Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 
84 MICH. L. REV. 430 (1985). 
